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INTRODUCTION Defendant District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, (the "Authority") hereby responds to the Court's Order of July 2, 1998, to Show Cause why Plaintiffs' application for a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) should not be granted. Plaintiffs, 20 residents of the District of Columbia, filed their Complaint against the President of the United States, the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Sergeant At Arms of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Authority. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have violated their Constitutional right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and have failed in their obligation to guarantee to all citizens of the District of Columbia a republican form of government as required by Article 4, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. [page 2] Plaintiffs' prayer for relief seeks declaratory and injunctive remedies that would: abolish the Authority (Prayer for Relief C4); effectively shut down the United States Congress by limiting each State to only one member in the House of Representatives (Id. C2a, C2b, C3); and prevent the President from enforcing any law that solely affects the District of Columbia (Id. C1a, C1b). Plaintiffs would have this Court impose these draconian remedies until such time as the District of Columbia is admitted as a State or is unified with a previously-existing State. (Id. C1-C4). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(a), Plaintiffs have requested a three-judge court to hear this action. The statute provides as follows: A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of Congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body. (Emphasis added). In attempting to persuade this Court that a three-judge panel is required, Plaintiffs spend almost 12 pages of argument asserting that their lawsuit comes within the "substantive concerns of [ 2284]". Memorandum Of Points and Authorities In Support of Plaintiffs' Application For A Three-Judge Court (hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Memo.") at 4-15. Through a series of citations to dictionaries, scholarly works and even a baseball analogy, Plaintiffs have attempted to establish that their lawsuit is "...an action ... challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts ...", and therefore within the scope of 28 U.S.C. 2284(a). [footnote 1: There is no dispute that the only provision of 2284(a) that could apply in this case is the "challenging [of] the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts," i.e., a three-judge court is not "otherwise required by Act of Congress," nor does the action challenge "the apportionment of any statewide legislative body."] Dictionaries, scholarly works and analogies, however, are not dispositive of Congressional intent and cannot override explicit statutory language and legislative history. As we now show, Plaintiffs' attempt [page 3] to bring their lawsuit under 2284(a) is contrary to the language, history, and established judicial interpretation of the statute. This Court should therefore deny the Plaintiffs' application for a three-judge panel. 1. The Statutory Language. Plaintiffs seem to realize that the text of 2284(a) does not support their interpretation of the statute. Plaintiffs have attempted to broaden the statute by stating that: ..... the question is whether the instant case, in any way, concerns the apportionment of congressional districts." Plaintiffs' Memo. at 4. (Emphasis added). In fact, none of the underlined words is in the statute. They are imported by the Plaintiffs in an effort to stretch the statute beyond its plain and narrow meaning. The text of 2284 requires that the Plaintiffs' lawsuit challenge the constitutionality of the apportionment of a congressional district. Plaintiffs cannot possibly be challenging any such district, because the District of Columbia does not have a Congressman or Congressional district, only a non-voting Delegate to the House of Representatives. See 2 U.S.C. 25a. [footnote 2: Plaintiffs concede in their papers. "While the Plaintiffs do enjoy the benefits of sending a 'Delegate' to the House of Representatives, they are not represented in the House, since the Delegate is not entitled to vote and is denied numerous other privileges of membership in Congress. The Plaintiffs have no representation in the Senate." Plaintiffs' Memo. at 21 n.8. (Emphasis in original).] Thus, Plaintiffs' actual challenge is to the lack of a statute apportioning a Congressional district to the District of Columbia, a claim clearly outside the scope of 2284(a). 2. The Legislative History. Citations to the legislative history of 2284 are conspicuously absent from Plaintiffs' lengthy argument, perhaps because the legislative history of Pub. L. 94-381, the Act that rewrote 2284 in 1976, forecloses exactly the type of broad construction that Plaintiffs are advancing. In [page 4]1976, Congress significantly narrowed the provisions of the U.S. Code requiring a three-judge court, with the express purpose of "reduc[ing] sharply the class of cases requiring the convening of a three-judge court." City of Philadelphia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 657, 658 (E.D. Penn. 1980) (citing H.R. Rep. No 94-1 379, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); and S.Rep No.204-94, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976.)). See also Young-Bey v. Barry, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12342 (D.D.C. 1989) (Oberdorfer, J.). [footnote 3: Prior to 1976, a three-judge court was required in any case seeking an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining enforcement of any Act of Congress or State statute on the ground of unconstitutionality. 28 U.S.C. 2281, 2282 (since repealed).] The reason for this change was set forth in the Senate Committee report that accompanied the legislation: "Three-judge court procedure has recently been termed by one scholar, the single worst feature in the Federal judicial system as we have it today. It has imposed a burden on the Federal Courts and has provided a constant source of uncertainty and procedural pitfalls for litigants." S.Rep. No.94-204 at 1989. (Emphasis added). The Committee Report makes clear that Congress did not intend 2284(a) to be a catchall for any lawsuit taking issue with apportionment in general, but a narrow provision to be invoked only when a statute establishing an apportionment of congressional districts is challenged. "Subsection (a).. .require[s] []a three-judge court in cases challenging the constitutionality of any statute apportioning congressional districts or apportioning any statewide legislative body." S. Rep. 94-204 at 2000. (Emphasis added). Thus, the inquiry must be: are Plaintiffs challenging a statute apportioning congressional districts within the meaning and purpose of 2284(a)? Because no such statute exists in the District of Columbia, the answer is no. [page 5] 3. The Judicial Decisions. If there were any doubt that this Court should not adopt the elastic interpretation of 2284(a) that Plaintiffs propose, it is settled by Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 916. In Klutznick, a case challenging the census, the Court analyzed the legislative history of 2284 and concluded that a three-judge panel was not required because the challenge was not to "any state action reapportioning congressional districts." Klutznick, 486 F. Supp at 577 (Emphasis added.). See also City of Philadelphia, 503 F. Supp. at 658. The holding of Klutznick is equally applicable in the present case, where no state action, but rather Congressional inaction, is being challenged by Plaintiffs. CONCLUSION The Plaintiffs' application for a three-judge court should be denied. Daniel A. Rezneck Dated: July 21, 1998 |
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