LOIS E. ADAMS, et al, Plaintiffs
v. Civil Action No. 98-1665-LFO
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, et al, Defendants
____________________________________________

CLIFFORD ALEXANDER, et al, Plaintiffs
v. Civil Action No. 98-2187-LFO
WILLIAM M. DALEY, Secretary of Commerce, et al, Defendants

ORDER

The plaintiffs in Adams move to reconsider this court's Order of August 31, 1998, which
denied their motion for leave to file a reply to a reply memorandum of the District of Columbia
Financial Responsibility and Financial Assistance Authority. The gist of the plaintiffs' argument is
that (a) neither the federal rules of civil procedure nor the local rules prohibit surreplies and (b)
the filing of the surreply would serve this court's "serious interest in insuring that cases are
well-presented and well briefed, that all parties have equal opportunities to present their
arguments, and that the court have a balanced record on which to analyze and decide the merits of
all questions." The plaintiffs also refer to "the larger concept of due process of law, which both
guides and compels our judicial system."
These arguments do not appear to be substantially different from the arguments contained in
the original motion to file the [page 2] document. While the original order was signed by another
judge, in itself that is not an appropriate reason to file a motion to reconsider. The order was an
order of this court, and is binding absent extraordinary circumstances. The motion to reconsider
fails to identify such circumstances.
While it is true that the local rules do not prohibit replies to reply memoranda, the failure to
mention sur replies is significant. A movant is required to presents its arguments in support of a
motion in its initial brief; the court may treat arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief
as waived. Consequently, three memoranda per motion is the norm. Neither the Supreme Court
rules, see Sup. Ct. R. 25.5, nor the rules of appellate procedure, see F.R.A.P. 28(c), allow for
further briefing as a matter of course.
The presence of new arguments in a reply brief may be grounds for the non movant to seek to
file a surreply: at least it places the issue of waiver on the record in the event the motion to file a
surreply is denied and the court relies on an argument first advanced in a reply brief. But not one
of the 13 grounds cited in support of the plaintiffs' original motion concerned the appearance of
new arguments in the reply brief. Nor do the plaintiffs mention "late authorities, newly enacted
legislation, or other intervening matter that was not available in time to be included" in their
memorandum in opposition. Sup. Ct. R. 25.5; see also D.C. Cir. R. 28(g) ("[A] supplemental brief
may cite and discuss only authorities issued since the filing of the party's last brief."). Accordingly,
it is this 7th day of December 1998,
ORDERED: that the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider shall be DENIED.

Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge


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