Under the Constitution, the Plaintiffs are entitled to the equal protection of the laws. This means that Congress must treat the Plaintiffs in a way substantively identical to the way it has treated all other people over whom Congress has or has had identical powers under the Constitution unless Congress has compelling and narrowly tailored governmental purposes which might sustain the continual discriminatory treatment (such reasons are required since the result of Congress' discriminatory action is infringement of a number of fundamental rights).

The Adams Plaintiffs' claim to the equal protection of the laws is completely different from the equal protection claim presented in Alexander v. Daley. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in [Adams] v. Clinton Showing Cause Why These Cases Should Not be Consolidated (Oct. 21, 1998) at 4-7 & 10-12 and Motion [of same Plaintiffs] to Alter or Amend (Nov. 12, 1998). Where the Adams Plaintiffs complain that Congress and the Defendant have not treated them in the same manner as others over whom they have identical powers, the Alexander Plaintiffs complain that Congress has not treated them differently than it has treated anyone else. Where the Adams Plaintiffs are injured because Congress and the Defendant have treated them differently from all others, the Alexander Plaintiffs demand unique treatment. The Alexander Plaintiffs complain that Congress has not carved out a wholly novel and unique status for the citizens of the District which would result in the Plaintiffs ability to exercise a single indicium of the rights enjoyed by everyone else in the United States, in a manner allegedly "equal" to the rights exercised by all others. In other words, the "equality" the Alexander Plaintiffs demand is equality of result in one particular aspect of opportunity, but to be exercised from a different status, on a different basis, through unique treatment. ⁽⁸⁾ The "equality" demanded by the Adams Plaintiffs, on the other hand, is strict equal treatment, with the result that the Plaintiffs will share equal status, on the same basis as all other, with the eventual result that they will share equal opportunities to exercise all the rights and responsibilities, privileges and immunities of citizenship, as do the others. See Adams Plaintiffs' Response to Memorandum of Committee for the Capital City, Amicus Curiae (Apr. 1, 1999) and Adams Plaintiffs' Response to Memorandum of Eleven Law Professors, Amici Curiae (Apr. 1, 1999)

In Count One of their Complaint, the Adams Plaintiffs ask, if Congress can integrate all the other people over whom Congress now has or has had identical constitutional powers into the matrix, why not the residents of the District of Columbia? If Congress has insulated all those other people from its legislative whims and experiments such that the President is not set as de facto "Crown Governor" over the others, why use the Plaintiffs as guinea pigs and "models" for experiments? What are the compelling governmental reasons which require Congress to segregate over half a million people from the constitutional matrix which is good enough for all the rest of the country? Plaintiffs demand that the Defendant prove compelling governmental reasons why the Defendant may continue to execute and enforce laws Congress imposes on the District of Columbia yet does not impose over any of the other people over whom Congress now has or has had identical constitutional powers.

Absent a proper showing by the Defendant, the Adams Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter injunctions shielding them from further control by Congress. That done, even though the Adams Plaintiffs still won't be part of the matrix, they can nevertheless proceed to govern themselves in a manner closer to that of the others, which they are entitled to do for the reasons given in the Adams Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of [their first] Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 22, 1998 ("Plaintiffs' 12/22/98 MSJ Memorandum"), incorporated in the present Motion by reference. But the injunctions demanded also do place the Plaintiffs in the same position as the others for, like the others, the Plaintiffs would be sheltered from Congressional micro management through the agency of the Defendant. ⁽⁹⁾

The Adams Plaintiffs come to court, humbly and with the greatest respect, demanding the equal protection of the laws of the United States of America and expecting the benefits of the due process of law, which even the Defendant is bound to respect. Since Congress has chosen to segregate the citizens of the District of Columbia from the matrix into which it has integrated all other people over whom it has or has had identical powers, they ask this Court to issue an injunction protecting them from Congress' ongoing micro management of local government. Since Congress micro manages the lives of these Plaintiffs in part through the agency and instrumentality of the President as chief executive (charged, inter alia, with appointing all local judges and members of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority), the Court can grant relief to the Plaintiffs by restraining the President from executing over the Plaintiffs the will of Congress, which it does not wield over any of the other people elsewhere over whom Congress has or has had identical powers under the Constitution. ⁽¹⁰⁾

The Adams Plaintiffs are entitled to have their demand for equal treatment with those other groups heard and analyzed on the record and on the merits of their case. Consistent with the due process of law, the claims made in Adams v. Clinton cannot be collapsed into nor disposed of under analysis of the claims made in Alexander v. Daley. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in [Adams] v. Clinton Showing Cause Why These Cases Should Not be Consolidated (Oct. 21, 1998) and Motion [of same Plaintiffs] to Alter or Amend (Nov. 12, 1998). The Defendant errs in expecting the Court to discard this case in an act of judicial léger demain, slipping it out of sight under analysis of the claims presented in a venerable but logically antithetical case.

RE: THE DEFENDANT'S EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENTS

Plaintiffs have shown, on the basis of extensive legal argument and copious documentary evidence that Congress, by and through the agency of the Defendant (and others) charged with executing or enforcing laws Congress passes, has treated the citizens of the District differently than it has treated millions of people in other places over which Congress has or has had identical powers under the Constitution, with the result that the citizens of the District are deprived of a number of fundamental rights, which the others now enjoy. Plaintiffs have shown that, a half century ago, the residents of the federal enclaves were in the same position as the Plaintiffs, deprived of all capacity of local self-government (and also excluded from representation in Congress) by virtue of the fact that they were not deemed citizens of any states. See Plaintiffs' 12/22/98 MSJ Memorandum at 37-37; Exhibit V filed in support of Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts filed in support of their December 22, 1998 Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibit Y filed in support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Clinton's Opposition, March 8, 1999, both incorporated in the instant Motion by reference. Congress changed the status of the residents of the federal enclaves, but has not changed the Plaintiffs' status. Residents of the federal enclaves now enjoy exercise of all fundamental rights implicated in this case, but the Plaintiffs and their neighbors do not, all because of Congressional actions. On the basis of this comprehensive and well-documented factual showing, Plaintiffs claim violations of their rights to the equal protection of the laws. See Plaintiffs' 12/22/98 MSJ Memorandum and Statement of Material Facts and Exhibits filed on December 22, 1998.

In response to this showing, the Defendant proffers two categories of "legal" defenses, which fail in the face of the plain language of the Constitution. The Defendant completely neglects his third alternative, which would have been to lodge an "evidentiary" defense.

A: First, the Defendant suggests that the residents of the District of Columbia are not entitled to the protections of the Constitution, necessarily meaning that they are second-class citizens, inferior to all other citizens of the United States because they are not under the full umbrella of constitutional protections. The Defendant also infers that the Adams Plaintiffs don't deserve rational analysis of their actual claims, arguments, and evidence, because the Defendant repeatedly addresses claims the Plaintiffs do not make. But the Defendant fails in both efforts.

The Defendant opines that he shares the Three-judge District Court's sense of the "gravity of the plaintiffs' grievances," but concludes that the plaintiffs have no legal remedy, but must turn to "the political process." But the Defendant gives no explanation why, of all the people over whom Congress has had power under the District Clause itself or under its alter ego, the Enclaves Clause, the residents of the District alone are not entitled to the equal protection of the laws (equal treatment by government), nor why District residents alone might be stripped of their rights to seek legal remedies, nor why District residents alone are not entitled to reasoned and conscientious evaluation of their claims on the merits and factual record.

The Defendant argues that the Adams Plaintiffs are not entitled to the equal protection of the laws because "Congress' continued exercise of [its] authority" over the District "cannot violate the Constitution under the Fifth Amendment" (pp. 10-11 (emphasis added)). ⁽¹¹⁾ The Defendant thus infers that the District Clause confers powers which are not limited by any other provision of the Constitution (as if to say the equal protection provisions of the Constitution are "unconstitutional" under the District Clause). This proposition is decidedly wrong; the courts have always stressed that Congress may not violate any provision of the Constitution in ruling the District of Columbia, even in light of Congress' powers under the District Clause. See Plaintiffs' 12/22/98 MSJ Memorandum at pp. 25-27 (over a dozen cases cited)

These Plaintiffs brought this suit to terminate their continual segregation from the mainstream of American political and legal existence, which all other people subject to the same powers of Congress now enjoy. Thus, this case is structurally and formally identical to cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and their progeny, so it is surprising that the Defendant now advances arguments which indicate that cases such as Brown must have been improperly decided. Unless the Defendant presents a sound legal foundation for his assertion that the Adams Plaintiffs are second-class citizens under the Constitution, not entitled to the equal protection of the laws, there is no reason for the Court to relegate these plaintiffs to a "political process" from which they are assiduously excluded.

B: As a secondary "legal" response to the Adams Plaintiffs' factual and legal showings, the Defendant infers that there is a textual, legal distinction between the classes at issue. We say "infers" because a direct presentation of this proposition would be facially unsupportable, since one of those classes to which the Adams Plaintiffs might be compared-residents of the former portion of the District south-west of the Potomac River-were ruled under the exact same words of the same grammatical clause of the Constitution as Congress continues to apply to the Adams Plaintiffs. In order to press this argument, then, the Defendant would have to show that the residents of the present District were somehow constitutionally inferior, second-class citizens, as compared to those of the former portion of the District south-west of the Potomac, despite the identity of the source of Congress' powers over the two classes.

The Defendant has also suggested--without the slightest factual support--that the federal enclaves are limited to "federal research centers, wetland areas, and national forests" (pp. 11-12), although the Adams Plaintiffs have proven that they are talking about over five million places where many millions of people reside. See Exhibit V filed in support of Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts filed in support of their December 22, 1998 Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibit Y filed in support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Clinton's Opposition, March 8, 1999, both incorporated in the instant Motion by reference. The Defendant's attempt to minimize the legal status of the Adams Plaintiffs' discrete group, gilded with undocumented assertions that the District is "clearly" different (p. 11) must fail under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986), for the Defendant has utterly failed to place a single piece of evidence before the Court to rebut the Adams Plaintiffs' showings. Were it so "clear," the Defendant could easily have presented "clear" proof of the proposition. Were it so "clear," the Defendant could have "clearly" rebutted Defendant's counsel's own official report entered into evidence by the Plaintiffs, Exhibit Y attached to Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Clinton's Opposition to Plaintiffs [First] Motion for Summary Judgment (March 8, 1999) (see especially pp. 67-68 & 144-52), which itself "clearly" supports the Plaintiffs' claims.

But for the most part, the Defendant's most common manner of arguing that the Adams Plaintiffs are in a unique class is to simply beg the question. ⁽¹²⁾ The Defendant says that it is "neither relevant nor instructive" to draw the distinctions the Adams Plaintiffs draw (p. 11), elaborating versions of the proposition that, because Congress has drawn the distinctions, the distinctions are valid. In other words, the Defendant asserts that because Congress has discriminated against the citizens of the District, it's all right for Congress to discriminate.

The crudeness of this argument is highlighted if we substitute for the Adams Plaintiffs' claim in the instant case the sort of claim which might have been made a half century ago by black people subjected to generically identical discrimination. Against a claim that there was no compelling governmental reason for Arkansas to segregate black students from white students and place them in inferior schools, the Topeka Board of Education might have said, "the fact that we treat black people differently than others in the school system proves that it's legally legitimate to treat black people differently than others in the school system." It's stunning that a President of the United States would now ask a court to credit such an argument.

More nuanced expressions of begging the question lie in the Defendant's arguments concerning "Framers' intent" and in his assertion that denial of representation "is drawn by the Constitution itself" (p.12, quoting the Three-judge majority decision, slip op. at 64). ⁽¹³⁾ Insofar as it's proper to speak in terms of "denial," then precisely the same "denial" is "drawn by the Constitution itself" with reference to the federal enclaves, with the result that the people there would be "denied" representation in Congress, absent Congressional action to provide it. And Congress did provide it. Congress changed the situation of the residents of the federal enclaves, not by making a legislative end-run around the Constitution, but by altering the nature and scope of its jurisdiction over the federal enclaves. "Congress . . . permitted the States to extend important aspects of state powers over federal areas[, and it remains] true that federal enclaves are still subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and Congress could restrict as well as extend the powers of the States within their bounds[.]" Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423-25 (1970) (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted). Congress' disparate action has resulted in differences in the degree to which Congress-acting through the offices of the Defendant-can and does micro manage local affairs in ways its does not over places where it has now or has had identical powers under the Constitution or has immunized the residents of those places by allowing them to be incorporated into the system of the several states.

The Defendant's reference to "Framers' intent" (pp. 10-11) is to no greater effect, since it also begs the question. Whatever the Framers' intended for the District of Columbia, the Framers intended the same thing for the federal enclaves. See Exhibit W filed in support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Clinton's Opposition, March 8, 1999, incorporated in the instant Motion by reference. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Thus, since the "intention" in granting Congress power over the district which would house the seat of the federal government was identical to the "intention" in granting Congress power over the federal enclaves. That unitary "intention" cannot explain, must less legitimate, the discriminatory treatment of the District.

C: Finally and most to the point, the Defendant could have tried to produce evidentiary proof that there is a compelling governmental reason for Congress to segregate the Plaintiffs in this case (and all others who live within the District of Columbia) from others subject to the same constitutional powers and proceed to deprive them of their opportunities to exercise a number of fundamental rights. The Defendant has most certainly not done this. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Instead of attending to his burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and governing law construing it, the Defendant-at most--plays shell games with allusions to the District (pp. 10-11), collapsing all localities within the District into an amorphous mass in complete and unsupported disregard for the Affidavits filed by each Plaintiff proving that no governmental purpose is executed in their home, neighborhood, or place of business, see Exhibits A-T filed in support of Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts filed in support of their December 22, 1998 Motion for Summary Judgment, incorporated in the instant Motion by reference, all in light of the fact that Congress has adjusted the size and definition of the District of Columbia several times, see Plaintiffs' 12/22/98 MSJ Memorandum at 23. ⁽¹⁶⁾ None of the Defendant's statements about what the District "is" or about "any number of practical reasons" (p. 12) Congress might use it as a plaything or hobby horse are supported by even a hint of evidence.

In summary: Congress may do whatever it wishes with the District of Columbia and with its federal enclaves, but Congress may not violate the constitutional rights of the people who live in these places. If Congress (acting through the offices of the Defendant) violates the rights of the people who live under its power, then that power may be restrained. See Plaintiffs' 12/22/98 MSJ Memorandum at 24-27. The fact of the discriminatory treatment is only the beginning of the analysis of the question presented in this Motion. Since the Defendant has failed to make a showing that the law defines the Adams Plaintiffs as second-class citizens (either because they are not entitled to the protections of the Constitution or because the Constitution defines them as second class) and since the Defendant has failed to present evidence proving that there is any compelling governmental reason to discriminate against the citizens of the District, the Adams Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor. "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith [when] the pleadings [and other evidence] . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). ⁽¹⁷⁾

RE: THE DEFENDANT'S "STANDING" ARGUMENT

For the most part, the Defendant reiterates arguments made in the past, including confusing injunctions which require action from injunctions which prohibit action (pp. 6-8). The Adams Plaintiffs most certainly do not ask this Court to order the Defendant or Congress to affirmatively do anything. On the other hand, the President cannot flaunt the Constitution without risking injunctions prohibiting further depredations against the Constitution. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Nov. 2, 1998) at 27-37.

On page 7 of his Opposition, the Defendant states that "plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief against the President is designed to prohibit him from exercising his . . . [power] to sign into law, and thereafter enforce, any legislation applicable to the District as enacted by Congress[.]" This statement is correct as altered by the Plaintiffs by deletion of the words "constitutional authority," because the President has no "constitutional authority" to violate the Constitution or to violate the rights of the citizens which are guaranteed under the Constitution. ⁽¹⁸⁾ If Congress passed a law authorizing the President to appropriate (without compensation) the property of all rich white men, it's a fair bet that there would be a stampede to the courthouse for injunctions to stop him acting on that statute, on the grounds that enforcing that law would violate the Constitution. Unless the citizens of the District are constitutionally inferior to those (hypothetically injured) rich white men, they are entitled to protection from enforcement of laws which violate their rights. If the President is the person charged by Congress to enforce laws which violate the rights of the citizens of the District, the President may be enjoined from such enforcement. ⁽¹⁹⁾

The Defendant also asserts that there are serious "redressability" problems with the Plaintiffs' Complaint (pp. 8-10), but all the Defendant's assertions all fail because the Defendant attacks a straw man. The Defendant persistently says that the Adams Plaintiffs brought this action to "obtain representation" in the House or Senate (pp. 3-6, 8-10). But since the Adams Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to order directly (into the ether?) that the Plaintiffs be represented, nor do they ask the Court to order Congress or the President or anyone else to pass a law to give them representation, ⁽²⁰⁾ the Defendants' entire discussion of "redressability" (pp. 8-10) is an irrelevant diversion. Also, since the issue in the instant Motion is strictly limited to issues not concerned with apportionment of representation in Congress (because those issues were retained by the Three-judge District Court, whose actions are not at issue in this Motion), the Defendant's forays into the questions of apportionments are gratuitously irrelevant. ⁽²¹⁾

The Defendant's argument on pages 9-10 of his Opposition is incomprehensible. The gist of it seems to be that, because various laws have already been passed, an injunction against enforcement of them cannot result in anything beneficial to the Plaintiffs. This is nonsense (even without observing that it's well-neigh impossible to bar enforcement of laws which don't exist), but the nonsense results from the Defendant's mischaracterization of the Plaintiffs' aims. The Adams Plaintiffs are not interested in "influencing Congress' exercise of [power] over the District" (p. 9). ⁽²²⁾ Rather, the Adams Plaintiffs ask the Court to restrain an agent of Congress from executing laws which violate their rights insofar as Congress imposes those laws on the citizens of the District but does not impose those laws on anyone else over whom Congress now has or has had identical powers under the Constitution and insofar as the Plaintiffs are not in the same position as those other people are now, due to a pattern of acts and policies of Congress.

It might also be noted that laws may be "on the books" for decades, yet prohibitions against enforcement of those laws can go a long way to remedying injuries which would arise if those laws were enforced. For instance, the State of Virginia kept its miscegenation statutes in its civil Code (§ 20-59) long after the Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), that those statutes could not be enforced. The Supreme Court's findings and the injunctions which were based on them prevented those laws from being enforced, however, despite the fact that they were already "on the books." This was certainly beneficial to the Lovings and it's startling that the President of the United States would suggest otherwise.

So again, unless the Defendant is arguing that the President has a constitutional license to violate the law or is "above" the law, or that the citizens of the District are second-class citizens who don't have any rights, or that the citizens of the District don't deserve reasoned examination of them under the law, then the Defendant's argument on this score is insubstantial.

Under Lujan v. Defendants of Wildlife, it is required that the plaintiff show that "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (cited as well on page 10 of the Defendant's Opposition). Neither Lujan not any other authority known to Plaintiffs requires that the "redress" the plaintiff demands somehow "fix" every aspect of the injury which might be the basis of the case. If someone is an object of the action at issue in the case, there is "little question" that a judgment preventing the action will redress it. Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 561-62. In fact, an injunction barring enforcement of an unconstitutional statute or action would be "of immense benefit" to anyone subject to the unconstitutional statute or action. Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 513 (1996). It is enough that the relief sought would deactivate or nullify the act or policy complained of, and such a result can come simply from a declaration that the act or policy is unconstitutional. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1996), (specific principle of standing) aff'd sub nom Miller v. Albright, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 1436 (1998).

In this case, the Adams Plaintiffs complain that:

Defendant William Jefferson Clinton in his official capacity as the President of the United States has ratified, approved, implemented, and enforced Acts, Mandates, and resolutions of Congress which are directed solely at the citizens of the District of Columbia, which includes the Plaintiffs, and which are not directed at any resident of any federal enclave, preventing the Plaintiffs from electing representatives to Congress having full powers and rights under the Constitution, preventing them from enjoying the benefits of citizenship in a state, and trenching on other fundamental constitutional rights and that these actions of Defendant William Jefferson Clinton in his official capacity as President of the United States violate the Plaintiffs' rights to the equal protection of the laws under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.

Complaint, ¶¶ 72-73. Imposition of these laws--in and of itself--violates the Plaintiffs rights, for Congress has not imposed these laws on any resident of any federal enclave or on the former portion of the District of Columbia south-west of the Potomac River or on the former continental territories, despite the fact that Congress has or has had identical powers over those places under the Constitution. And it goes without saying that these laws also interfere in the most basic way with the Adams Plaintiffs' efforts to govern themselves at the most basic levels and the record reflects that these actions are insults and injure the Plaintiffs. See Affidavits of the Plaintiffs attached to the Statement of Material Facts in support of the Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary Judgment, especially Tab E at ¶ 18 & attached Statement; Tab F at ¶ 17; Tab G at ¶¶ 18-20; Tab O at ¶ 17; Tab Q at ¶¶ 16-17; Tab T at ¶ 10. Restraining the President from enforcing these Acts, Mandates, and resolutions of Congress would surely redress some measure of the Adams Plaintiffs' injuries (though not all injuries, but Lujan doesn't require that a decision on a given claim redress all possibly identifiable injuries; the Court need only do what the Court can do). ⁽²³⁾

For all these reasons and for the reasons set out more fully in the Adams Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Federal Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Nov. 2, 1998) at 1-18 and 27-38. Therefore, the Court should grant the Adams Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Entry of Summary Judgment on their Remaining Claims Against Defendant Clinton (Mar. 23, 2000). Also, since this issue is ripe for decision now and since there is no legal or other connection between the instant Motion filed in Adams v. Clinton and the Motion to Reconsider filed in Alexander v. Daley on April 3, 2000, the Court need not delay entry of judgment, as requested on behalf of the Alexander Plaintiffs in their Motion to Reconsider at p. 5.

And one final observation with regard to the Defendant's suggestion that the Plaintiffs have no recourse but to take their complaints to Congress and the "political process" (p. 3): just as the Three-judge District Court was able to address the claims, arguments, and demands presented in Alexander v. Daley-and just as the Adams Plaintiffs are deeply gratified that one member of the Three-judge District Court found that there is such a thing as a fundamental right to vote and that the citizens of the District are seriously injured in being unable to exercise that right, the discrete claims, arguments, evidence, and demands presented in Adams v. Clinton may be addressed, with similar exactitude. But if a United States District Court cannot address the Adams Plaintiffs' textbook case of a violation of the equal protection provisions of the Constitution, based on well-settled law and copious, unchallenged documentary evidence, there is no reason to expect that Congress, which is responsible for the disparate treatment at issue, will be responsive to the Plaintiffs' plight, nor take any effective step to rectify the disparate treatment.

Respectfully submitted,

George S. LaRoche,

D.C. Bar number 421991

301-891-3857 (voice & fax)

1 Valley View Avenue

Takoma Park, MD 20912

Lois E. Adams, et al, |

Plaintiffs, |

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versus | Civil Case No: 98-1665 (LFO)

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William Jefferson Clinton, |

Defendant |

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|

Clifford Alexander, et al, |

Plaintiffs, |

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versus | Civil Action No: 98-2187 (LFO)

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William Daley, et al, |

Defendants |

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Undersigned counsel for the Plaintiffs in Adams v. Clinton hereby certifies that, on the same day the Plaintiffs' Reply was filed with the Clerk of the Court, copies were as indicated to counsel of record for the Defendant. Courtesy copies were also sent, by first class mail, to counsel for the former Defendants in this case and to counsel in the consolidated case, Alexander v. Daley.

John R. Tyler, attorney at law for Defendant Clinton

Civil Division, U.S. D.O.J. by first class mail, postage prepaid

901 E Street, N.W. Room 1074

Washington, D.C. 20004