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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Lois E. Adams, et al,
Plaintiffs,
versus
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Civil Action No: 98-1665 (LFO, MBG, CKK)
William Jefferson Clinton, et al,
Defendants
RESPONSE OF TWENTY CITIZENS, PLAINTIFFS IN ADAMS V. CLINTON,
TO MEMORANDUM OF PAUL STRAUSS, AMICUS CURIAE
District of Columbia Shadow Statehood Senator Paul Strauss has filed a
Memorandum as Amicus Curiae, concerning the Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment in
both cases before the Court. Senator Strauss extends the arguments made by the Plaintiffs
in Alexander v. Daley and rebuts arguments presented by the Defendants in Alexander, but
since the Senator declares to address both cases and "how they should proceed,"
and since he misstates two propositions of law directly at issue in Adams v. Clinton, the
Twenty Citizens present the following responses to the two propositions presented by the
Amicus which are at odds with the propositions at issue in Adams.
On pages 1-2 of his Memorandum, the Amicus states that "the right
of citizens of the United States to vote for members of Congress is a fundamental
attribute of United States citizenship" and "the right to vote for the United
States Congress is a privilege of national citizenship possessed by all citizens of the
United States proper." These statements are incorrect. The right to vote for [page 2]
members of Congress is an attribute of citizenship in a State. U.S. Const., art. I,
2, 1, 3, 1 (as amended by the 17th Amendment); see de la Rosa v.
United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1049 (1995); Casarez
v. Val Verde County, 957 F.Supp. 847, 853-56 (W.D. Tx. 1997); S nchez v. United
States, 376 F.Supp. 239, 241 (D.P.R. 1974) ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States[.]"
"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
[elected by the people thereof] for six Years[.]"); see also Twenty Citizens'
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 1-12.
On pages 9-11, the Amicus discusses the treatment of the residents of
the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), which is a federal enclave, and the
case Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), which concerned the rights of those residents.
On page 10, the Amicus states that the residents of NIH were citizens of Maryland prior to
cession of exclusive jurisdiction over NIH to Congress in 1953--which is correct--but the
Amicus then states that they remained state citizens until 1963, when the Maryland Court
of appeals "ruled that residents of federal enclaves were not [Maryland
residents]," citing Royer v. Bd. of Election Supervisors for Cecil County, 231 Md.
561, 191 A.2d 446 (Md.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963). The Amicus appears to argue
that Royer changed the legal status of enclave residents, and that Evans restored the
status quo ante.
In fact, Royer merely reiterated the longstanding, universal rule that
residents of federal enclaves were not citizens of the State. See 191 A.2d at 449; Tanner
v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 97 A.2d [page 3] 449 (Md. 1953); Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133
A.2d 729, 733 (Md. 1926). The sole reason that the residents of NIH continued to enjoy the
benefits of state citizenship for a period after the original cession (from 1953-1963) was
that the local officials were unaware of the law, or just ignored it (which wasn't unheard
of). [footnote 4: Evidence of this fact is in the briefs of the parties in Cornman v.
Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1969), and Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). If the
history of NIH assumes more significance than it seems to have at this stage of the case,
this evidence will be provided.] See Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the
Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States, Jurisdiction Over Federal
Areas Within the States; Part I: the Facts and Committee Recommendations, 57 (1956)
(Exhibit V to Twenty Citizens' Statement of Material Facts); id., Part II: A Text of the
Law of Legislative Jurisdiction, 169-248 (1957); Report of the U.S. D.O.J., Land and
Natural Resources Div., for Public Land Law Review Commission, Federal Legislative
Jurisdiction, 68 (1969) (Exhibit Y to Twenty Citizens' Reply to Opposition of President
Clinton).
When the Maryland officials expunged the names of NIH residents from
electoral rolls, the officials followed longstanding Maryland (and nationwide) law, which
they had ignored before then. But by the time Tillye Cornman (and others) sued to
vindicate their rights, the longstanding legal relationship between the States and the
federal enclaves had changed, such that the basis of the [page 4] longstanding law was no
longer sufficient to support the conclusion that the residents of the enclaves were not
citizens of the State. As the District Court observed:
Where the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over land
located within the geographical boundaries of a state, it can hardly be doubted that no
constitutional right of a resident of the enclave is infringed by the state's refusal to
grant such resident the right to vote. But it would be equally clear that if there were a
retrocession by the federal government to a state of all or substantially all incidents of
jurisdiction, such state could not constitutionally deny residents of the enclave the
right to vote.
Cornman v. Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D.Md. 1969), aff'd sub nom Evans v. Cornman, 398
U.S. 419 (1970). Thus Cornman didn't present a political claim that it's just
"right" to be allowed to vote, but a legal argument that (1) Congress had
withdrawn exclusive legislative jurisdiction over NIH and (2) Maryland had assumed enough
jurisdiction that (3) the State of Maryland could not deprive the residents of all
incidents of state citizenship, such as the right to vote. See 295 F. Supp. at 658-59.
This argument was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 398 U.S. at 423-24. The observation that
the residents of the federal enclaves shared interests with the residents of the State
(see Senator's Memorandum at pages 9-12) only confirmed that they had been incorporated
into the fabric of the states by retrocessions of jurisdiction by Congress and assumptions
of jurisdiction by the States. 398 U.S. at 425-25; 295 F. Supp. at 659. [footnote: The
Twenty Citizens' point is only to clarify the significance of Evans v. Cornman, because
they agree wholeheartedly with the Amicus that judicial or legislative concession of a
share in the Maryland franchise wouldn't cure the injuries suffered by the citizens of the
District of Columbia.]
Respectfully submitted,
George S. LaRoche
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